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Immunization Law: 
Litigating Alternative Facts1 
 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss 
 
From January 1, 2019, to March 21, 2019, 314 cases of measles 
have been confirmed in fifteen states.2  By comparison, the entire year 
of 2018 saw 372 cases, and that, too, was relatively high.  The rise in 
measles cases is directly connected to non-vaccination: The outbreaks 
are often started by unvaccinated individuals traveling from measles-
endemic areas or returning from such areas.  As a result, multiple states 
are considering tightening their school immunization mandates. This is 
unsurprising: school immunization mandates are highly effective at 
reducing outbreaks, and the stronger they are, the higher the state’s 
immunization rate.3  
California acted to strengthen its mandate in 2015, in response to a 
large measles outbreak centered on Disneyland. Legislators proposed 
SB277, a bill to remove California’s personal-belief exemption from 
school immunization requirements.  After a lengthy, fully deliberative 
process, the bill was signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown on June 
30, 2015.  
Naturally, opponents challenged the new law in the courts. So far, 
all courts—five trial courts (three federal, two state) and two California 
courts of appeal—have upheld SB277.  This chapter uses these 
litigations to examine the legal framework surrounding school 
immunization mandates, including the best arguments against school 
immunization mandates.  The chapter then confronts those arguments 
and explains why the extensive jurisprudence upholding school 
immunization mandates is correct.  As stated by California’s Second 
Appellate District, “compulsory immunization has long been 
recognized as the gold standard for preventing the spread of contagious 
diseases.”4  School mandates also fit well with our basic constitutional 
principles, and the arguments against them are unconvincing. 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Litigating 
Alternative Facts: School Vaccines Mandates in the Courts, 21 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 207 (2018). 
 2. Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, Measles Cases in 2019 
(Mar. 21, 2019). 
 3. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 211 n.25-28. 
 4. Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1146 (2018). 
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School immunization mandates exist in all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. All states offer medical exemptions from them, 
and most states offer nonmedical exemptions.  A jurisprudence going 
back to the 19th century, however, makes it clear that nonmedical 
exemptions are not required, and that a school mandate can be valid 
even if it is accompanied only by medical exemptions.  This 
jurisprudence is supported by three basic principles.  First, since the 
early days of the republic, America has recognized that public health is 
a core state function.  Second, the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that individual liberty can be limited to protect the public health—
especially in the context of communicable, dangerous diseases.  Third, 
school mandates specifically occupy a special place in our system 
because they sit at the intersection of two important justifications for 
state action: public health and children’s rights.  School mandates thus 
draw on another source of state power: parens patriae, the state’s role 
in protecting the vulnerable.  The value of protecting children—both 
the unvaccinated children left unprotected from disease by their 
parents’ choice, and other children in the school—strongly supports the 
legality of school immunization mandates.  This combination makes 
them especially constitutionally robust.  
This chapter groups arguments made by opponents of the law into 
three categories according to their strength: The strongest arguments, 
arguments that are plausible but incorrect under established 
jurisprudence, and implausible arguments.  The chapter analyzes each 
group and concludes, at the end of the day, that they all are 
unconvincing. 
The strongest arguments have some jurisprudential support and 
make plausible claims that mandates affect important countervailing 
rights.  There are three such arguments: the claim that school 
immunization mandates interfere with a child’s right to education, the 
claim that school immunization mandates run afoul of the First 
Amendment’s protections of free exercise of religion, and the claim 
that school immunization mandates impose an unconstitutional 
condition.  
The right to access education in California is based on a series of 
three cases in the 1970s that, in essence, found California’s system of 
public schools at the time to be unconstitutional, because it used a 
suspect category (wealth) in the context of a fundamental interest 
(education).5  But using these cases to argue against imposing a health-
and-safety regulation on schools misapplies them; in fact, health and 
                                                 
 5. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 1258 (Cal. 1971); 
see also Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
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safety are a precondition to education.  Further, between the children 
whose parents choose not to vaccinate, and the children who cannot be 
vaccinated for medical reasons and who depend on high rates in the 
school for their safety, the stronger claim is that of the children whose 
parents cannot protect, not that of the children whose parents choose 
not to protect.  Finally, the right to education is not absolute but can be 
overcome by the need to protect the health and safety of other 
students.6 
The Free Exercise Clause claim has been rejected by courts, most 
notably the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held 
that argument as foreclosed by Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
First Amendment,7 and California courts ruling on the constitutionality 
of SB277 have agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis.  However, 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions upholding religious 
protections raise questions about this claim, and the special place of the 
First Amendment in our constitutional order supports giving Free 
Exercise claims careful treatment.  Analysis of the recent Supreme 
Court decisions in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.8 and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission9 
reveals the care that the Supreme Court took to narrowly base these 
decisions, including specific carveouts for vaccines.  These cases do 
not, therefore, support a departure from the general framework used in 
past decades to reject First Amendment challenges to school 
immunization mandates.  
Finally, a creative argument urged in one of the lawsuits against 
SB277 contends that school mandates set an unconstitutional condition 
by conditioning a number of important rights—such as a child’s right 
to education, parents’ right to make medical decisions for their child, 
and a child’s right to privacy—on vaccinating. California’s Third 
Appellate District rejected this argument as “strong on hyperbole and 
scant on authority,” because none of the rights raised are absolute and 
the jurisprudence supports school mandates.10  Further, even the best 
interpretation of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, though 
confusing and unclear, does not support the unconstitutionality of 
school mandates. 
The second category of arguments opposing school immunization 
mandates appear plausible on their face but in fact have been addressed 
                                                 
 6. Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089–90 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
 7. Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 8. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–62 (2014). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 10. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2018/c086030.html. 
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conclusively and in depth by previous courts.  These arguments include 
claims that school mandates violate parental rights and rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
While the law recognizes parental rights, they have never been 
absolute.  Parental rights were always subject to limits to protect a 
child’s welfare.  In the context of school mandates, parental rights are 
weaker than in other contexts because the parental choice of non-
vaccination is contrary to the health and safety of both the parent’s own 
child and other parents’ children.  Lower immunization rates increase 
the risk of outbreaks in a school environment, threatening the health of 
everyone, and especially of the children who cannot be vaccinated for 
medical reasons.  Existing parental-rights jurisprudence does not 
support extending parental rights to include a right to make school less 
safe for other children.  For related reasons, the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected substantive due-process challenges to school 
mandates on the ground that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment can be limited to protect others.  
Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claims fail on two 
grounds.  First, children unvaccinated by choice are meaningfully 
different from other children.  Unvaccinated children are at higher risk 
of getting and transmitting a preventable disease.  This meaningful 
difference between vaccinated and unvaccinated children legitimates 
different treatment.  Further, children unvaccinated by parental choice 
are different from children unvaccinated because of medical 
exemptions.  All comparisons fail under the Equal Protection Clause 
for the same reason: the children are not similarly situated. Second, 
vaccination status is not a protected classification.  Thus, any legal 
distinctions based on vaccination status are scrutinized for a rational 
basis—and each of the distinctions made in SB277 has a rational basis.  
To give one example, distinguishing between children at different 
classes was adopted to allow for gradual implementation, preventing 
schools from being overwhelmed by having to address 200,000 exempt 
children at once and allowing most parents time to consider their 
option.  Those are reasonable goals, and the points chosen correspond 
to important changes in a child’s education, where most children 
already are in transition (entering the system, entering kindergarten, 
and entering seventh grade). 
The last category includes two implausible arguments made by 
plaintiffs.  While it is tempting to dismiss these far-fetched arguments 
out of hand, vaccination opponents likely will raise them again in cases 
and before legislators, so it remains important to address and provide 
answers to them.  
The first argument—made by a group of unrepresented plaintiffs—
was that SB277 violated the Racketeer and Corrupt Organization Act, a 
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RICO claim.  The claim appeared to be that the act was the result of a 
conspiracy by legislators to harm children.  The suit named many 
legislators, their spouses, the governor, and his wife as defendants. It 
failed for two reasons.  First, legislators and the governor are immune 
from suits for damages for legislative activity. Second, the events 
alleged did not plausibly satisfy the elements of RICO. 
The second implausible argument is that the Supreme Court in 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth11 declared vaccines “unavoidably unsafe,” and 
states cannot mandate unavoidably unsafe products.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court in Bruesewitz rejected the “unavoidably unsafe” 
argument.  In addition, the fact that vaccines have some risks does not 
automatically negate mandates—just as the risks of seatbelts do not 
automatically negate seatbelt mandates.  Like seatbelts, vaccines risks 
are much smaller than the risks they protect against.  
In short, the strong jurisprudence behind school mandates is as 
well-founded today as it was in 1905, when the Supreme Court first 
held a vaccination requirement constitutional.12  School mandates make 
school and communities safer and do not impermissibly violate 
constitutional rights.  There is every reason to continue to support them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 11. 562 U.S. 223, 226 (2011).  
 12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).  
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